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Some people oppose abortion on the grounds that fetuses have full moral status and thus 
a right to not be killed. Furthermore, many opponents of abortion claim special obligations of a 
parent to their child, whether born or unborn. These special obligations go beyond simply not 
killing the fetus or child. Rather, they place responsibility on the parents to keep the fetus or 
child alive at cost to themselves. Pregnant women are therefore obligated to continue unwanted 
pregnancies, necessitating the sacrifice of their bodily autonomy. They are obligated to accept 
the medical risks of pregnancy and obligated to allow the fetus full use of their reproductive 
organs.  
If abortion should be prohibited and a mother has a special obligation to her fetus and 
fetuses have full moral status, then parity of reasoning implies that a parent has a parallel 
obligation to donate organs to their child. For some, an obligation to donate may be an 
unacceptable intrusion upon one’s autonomy. People who think this cannot consistently maintain 
opposition to abortion, so long as fetuses have full moral status and a duty to protect holds 
between mother and fetus. For such people, our argument constitutes a reductio ad absurdum on 
the view that abortion is wrong. But our point is not merely conceptual: laws and institutional 
policies that restrict abortion, on pain of inconsistency, should also formalize the obligations to 
donate organs that mirror those restrictions on abortion. Parents’ willingness to donate organs to 
their child is irrelevant—they must donate whether they want to or not. 
In the first section, we outline the duty to protect. In the section that follows, we argue 
that in virtue of a duty to protect common to the mother-fetus relation and the parent-child 
relation, to say that abortion is impermissible implies parallel obligations to donate. In the third 
section we define the scope of the obligation to donate. At a minimum, a parent has an obligation 
to donate blood products, tissues, and marrow. We then outline the ways in which one can be 
excused from the obligation to donate and finish with concluding remarks. 
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A Duty to Protect 
 
Our argument begins with one proposition and two of its implications. The proposition is 
that embryos and fetuses at any stage of development have full moral status. Though this is 
highly contentious1234567, the best possible case for the prohibition of abortion requires it. The 
first implication of this proposition is that there is no change in moral status once a fetus is 
birthed—they were a full-on person all along. The second implication is that the parents have a 
special obligation to the fetus. This is to say that there is something in virtue of which at least the 
mother and more probably both parents have obligations to the fetus that are over and above 
those moral obligations they may have toward others. That is, they have to do some things for 
the fetus that they don’t have to do for other people. This recognition that parents have a special 
obligation toward their fetus follows from the notion that a fetus has full moral status and the 
notion that there are special obligations.  
For the proponent of prohibition of abortion, denying either of these notions is 
unattractive. Denying that fetuses have less than full moral status obviously weakens the case for 
the prohibition. Denying that some special obligation holds between parent and fetus is the 
equivalent of claiming that what a parent owes to their fetus is the same as what they owe to 
others. Combined with the claim that fetuses have full moral status, the claim that no special 
obligation holds between parent and fetus extends to children: parents owe nothing to their 
children over and above what they owe to others. In other words, the proponent of the 
prohibition of abortion must accept that parents have a special obligation to their fetus, or else 
maintain some untenable claim. 
Robert Goodin8 argues  that these obligations are derived from the relationship between a 
vulnerable person and the person to whom they are vulnerable. Or, A has a duty to protect B just 
in case B’s interests are vulnerable to A’s actions. There are many ways in which a person might 
be vulnerable to another, or ways in which their interest satisfaction depends on the other 
person’s actions. But generally the vulnerability is in their material and psychological interests. 
Some people depend on others for the satisfaction of their material and psychological interests. 
When they so depend, the person upon whom they depend is obligated to protect those interests. 
Goodin’s argument for this claim is rooted in common sense morality. We all think we 
have these obligations; indeed, a common objection to utilitarianism is that it may ignore the 
Penultimate draft. Final draft to be published in Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 
3 
special obligations we have to our family and friends and others who depend upon us. Given that 
we have these special obligations, what accounts for them? Goodin claims that we have these 
special obligations in virtue of others’ vulnerability to us. This view purports to not only account 
for why we have special obligations in the first place, but what we must do when we have them.  
When a person has a duty to protect another person, they must protect the interests of that 
person. However, the degree to which one must do so can vary according to the degree of 
dependence and, as with all obligations, one’s ability to protect those interests. Thus, the person 
nearest the child drowning in a shallow pond bears the greatest duty to protect that child because 
the child is most vulnerable to that person’s actions. Children are highly vulnerable, and more so 
to their parents than they are to others. Parents’ duty to protect their children is strong, perhaps 
strongest of all special obligations. In contrast, elderly parents are highly vulnerable to their adult 
children, especially emotionally so. Adult children are therefore obligated to protect them.  
Satisfying the duty to protect dictates very many of our behaviors, public and private. 
There are a few distinctive features of the duty. One is obvious: it can be violated even if no one 
is harmed. There are ways that a person can be wronged that are not harm-based, and among 
these ways is when one is entitled to protection from another agent but doesn’t get it. Another 
distinctive feature is less obvious. A person may have a duty to protect, even if there is no 
specific protectee. We all have a right not to be harmed, and we have this right at all times. But 
the right to be protected comes and goes, and varies according to our relationships we have with 
others. Consider the ship’s captain. They have a duty to protect their passengers, even before 
they are on board. They have a duty to protect future passengers. Passengers may come and go, 
but anyone on the ship is entitled to some protection. The same can be said of states and 
corporations. The duty to protect requires that the duty-bound throw up a shield. In some cases 
that shield might only require the protection of certain, identifiable individuals (i.e., children, 
elderly parents). But in other cases it might require the protection of people yet to be identified 
(e.g., future passengers on a ship).  
Granting that the proponent of abortion prohibition accepts that parents have a special 
obligation to fetuses, they must accept some grounds for this special obligation. We adopt 
Goodin’s vulnerability model, but there are others, such as the voluntarist account. This account 
maintains that special obligations obtain in virtue of one person self-assuming them. 9 
Importantly, the voluntarist account of the special obligation is prima facie incompatible with the 
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outright prohibition of abortion. For example, a voluntarist account of the special obligation 
would, at a minimum, maintain that when a fetus results from rape, the mother may not have a 
special obligation to the fetus, which may rule in the permissibility of aborting the fetus. 
Similarly, if the voluntarist account of the special obligation is right, then even when a 
pregnancy is unintended—when a person fails to assume the obligation for themselves—the 
special obligation to the fetus is not present, which may rule in the permissibility of aborting 
unintended fetuses. These are not claims that the proponent of the prohibition of abortion is 
likely to make. They may be able to still maintain a voluntarist account of the special obligation, 
but they will have to manage this prima facie incompatibility. And even if they do, as we argue 
below it may not help. 
Our claim is that if a special obligation grounds a parent’s duty to protect their fetus, and 
that aborting a fetus ought to be prohibited, then the same duty to protect obligates a parent to 
donate organs to their children. The wider the scope of the prohibition of abortion, the wider the 
scope of the obligation to donate. That is, if abortion ought to be prohibited in all cases, even 
when it requires that the parent die, then a parent must donate organs even when it requires that 
they die. Or, more generally, if the special obligation that holds between parent and fetus is 
strong enough to override the parent’s preferences for abortion, then it is also strong enough to 
override the parent’s preferences in the case of organ donation.  
 
From Abortion to Organ Donation 
 
The reasoning from the prohibition of abortion to the compulsion of organ donation is 
straightforward. If aborting a fetus wrongly violates the duty to protect, then because failing to 
donate one’s organs to one’s child also violates the duty to protect, failing to do so is similarly 
wrong. And if this wrongness is sufficient to coerce a person’s behavior in the case of abortion, 
then it is also sufficient to coerce a person’s behavior in the case of organ donation. That is, it 
should be sufficient reason to compel organ donation, if it is sufficient reason to prohibit an 
abortion. 
This reasoning obviously relies heavily on the claim that a parent failing to donate organs 
violates the duty to protect. The duty to protect is violated when a protector fails to shield a 
protectee from preventable suffering. If two people are related in the right sort of way, with one 
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vulnerable to the other, then the duty to protect kicks in. A parent is related in the right sort of 
way to their children, and so they are obligated to shield their child from suffering, so long as 
they are capable of doing so. Being incapable of doing something releases one from one’s 
obligation to do that thing. In the case of organ donation, there are many reasons why a parent 
may not be capable of donating. Foremost among these is that a parent might not be an 
appropriate match. In those cases, the parent’s obligation to protect their child in that way is 
excused. When the parent is not a match, their duty to protect is satisfied instead by facilitating 
the procurement of someone else’s organ, which can be satisfied by participating in the ordinary 
procurement process with a hospital.  
But if biological compatibility allows for a parent to donate an organ to their child, who, 
in the absence of a donated organ, is likely to suffer or die, and the parent fails to do so, they 
have violated the duty to protect. The duty to protect is grounded in the degree of vulnerability 
between the protector and protectee. The interests of a child who needs an organ are extremely 
vulnerable to the actions and omissions of their organ-matching parent, not just physically but 
also psychologically. The parent failing to donate further undermines the child’s interests in not 
suffering or not dying. 
Terminating a fetus similarly violates a duty to protect. If fetuses have full moral status, 
given that their interests are vulnerable to the actions and omissions of the mother, the mother 
has a duty to protect those interests, a duty to shield the fetus from things that undermine those 
interests. Terminating the life of the fetus certainly qualifies as failing to do this, so terminating a 
fetus is a violation of the mother’s duty to protect it. 
It is violation of this duty to protect that makes abortion wrong. Some might wish to 
resist this claim, and claim instead that some other duty is violated when one terminates a fetus, 
such as a duty to not harm persons. But such a claim limits the extent to which abortion is wrong. 
It is not always wrong to harm other persons. Some harms are justifiable, such as those that are 
required to protect one’s own interests. There are many circumstances in which a fetus plausibly 
undermines a person’s interests to the point that the only way those interests can be preserved is 
by terminating the fetus. If you wake up with a violinist attached to you, and you really don’t 
want that, the duty to non-maleficence proscribes unhooking him no more than it proscribes 
harming a home invader in the process of removing him from your house10. Because protecting 
one’s own interests so easily overrides the duty to non-maleficence, and there are many instances 
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in which a fetus undermines a person’s interests, there would be very many cases of morally 
permissible abortion, if the duty to non-maleficence is what makes abortion wrong. For example, 
abortion would be permissible whenever the mother felt that the fetus significantly undermines 
her own interests. This is not a view that proponents of a prohibition on abortion typically like to 
advance.  
Moreover, when one person has a duty to protect another, they also have a duty to not 
harm that person. The duty to protect implies the duty to non-maleficence. However, unlike the 
duty to non-maleficence, which only proscribes actions, the duty to protect also proscribes 
omissions. Thus, necessarily the duty to protect will place greater restrictions on a person’s 
behavior than will the duty to non-maleficence.  
Similarly, other values such as respect for persons are, though not mutually exclusive 
with the duty to protect, more easily overridden by a person’s other interests. Respect for persons 
might be foundational, but that does not entail that it always trumps other interests. Sometimes 
other values override respect for persons, such as when respecting a person, whatever that 
amounts to, requires significant sacrifice of life or other important interests.  
If the duty to protect holds between mother and fetus, there are strong grounds for a 
prohibition on abortion, even when the fetus results from rape. What establishes the duty to 
protect is the vulnerability that holds between two people. That the vulnerability results from 
rape does not undermine the relationship. The violinist is vulnerable to the person who wakes up 
hooked up to him, and significantly so. If you wake up with a violinist hooked up to you, 
regardless of whether you want him there, you have a duty to protect him. Unhooking him would 
violate that duty to protect, so it would be wrong to do that11. 
Our central claim is that the conjunction of the following three propositions entails an 
obligation to donate organs: (a) that fetuses have full moral status; (b) that a duty to protect holds 
between mother and fetus; and (c) that abortion should be prohibited. We assume, per the 
opponents of the permissibility of abortion, propositions (a) and (c). We have tried to motivate 
(b) in this section. In what follows, we outline how these propositions imply an obligation to 
donate organs. 
 
A Duty to Donate 
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If the duty to protect that holds between mother and fetus is sufficiently strong to 
outweigh a mother’s interests in terminating the fetus (which it must be if abortion ought to be 
prohibited), then the same is true when a parent has a duty to protect their child who needs an 
organ. Suppose that a person holds the view that abortion should be prohibited in all cases, even 
if it is necessary to save the life of the mother. If abortion is wrong in those circumstances, and 
it’s wrong because it violates the duty to protect, then parity of reasoning requires that where that 
same duty holds, a similar sacrifice is required. That is, where a person’s duty to protect is as 
strong as the duty that holds between mother and fetus, if satisfying the duty to protect requires 
the person sacrifice their own life, then sacrifice they must. 
A fetus is highly vulnerable to the mother. But children are similarly vulnerable, and not 
merely to the mother1213. While fetuses and infants are extremely physically vulnerable, as 
children age and their psychology develops they become additionally psychologically vulnerable 
to their parents. This combination of significant physical and psychological vulnerability to 
parents triggers a strong duty to protect. A parent therefore has a strong obligation to shield their 
child from suffering. There are no obvious reasons to think that the duty to protect that holds 
between parent and child, up to a certain age, is any weaker than that which holds between 
mother and fetus. 
If in the case of abortion this duty to protect is sufficiently strong to proscribe abortion in 
all cases, even when not terminating the fetus results in the mother dying, and the duty to protect 
between parent and child is just as strong, then it would be wrong for a biologically compatible 
parent to fail to donate an organ to their child in need. Suppose a child needs a lung or heart 
transplant, and their parent is a perfect match, and there are no other available donors. If a parent 
fails to donate an organ in this case, and the duty to protect is so strong that it requires the 
protector sacrifice their own life in throwing up a shield (as it would have to be to proscribe 
abortion in all circumstances), then a parent failing to donate would violate the duty to protect. If 
the mother’s interests in her own survival are not heavy enough to outweigh the fetus’s interests 
that the duty to protect guards, then either parent’s similar interests in keeping their lung or heart 
are also insufficiently heavy.  
One might object at this point that the duty to protect in the case of abortion proscribes an 
action, but that the relevant proscribed event in the case of organ donation is an omission. And 
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since there is a morally relevant difference between acts and omissions, the reasoning that 
proscribes abortion cannot similarly proscribe failing to donate.  
Granting the claim that there is generally a morally relevant difference between acts and 
omissions (which there may not be), the distinction is irrelevant in determining whether the duty 
to protect has been violated. Unlike the duty to non-maleficence, which typically is only violated 
by actions, the duty to protect is violated by both actions as well as omissions. The fact that the 
proscribed event in the case of organ donation is an omission is irrelevant. By omitting action, 
they have done something wrong. Similarly, the parent who fails to donate their organ to their 
child has done something wrong, if the duty to protect is so strong as to proscribe all abortions.  
The degree to which the duty to protect obligates organ donation is equal to the degree to 
which the duty to protect proscribes abortions. As the duty to protect varies in strength—as 
vulnerability varies between the protector and protectee—the actions and omissions it requires 
and proscribes vary. And since the duty to protect that holds between parent and child is as 
strong as that which holds between mother and fetus, the degree to which the duty requires self-
sacrifice in the case of abortion is equal to the degree to which it requires self-sacrifice in the 
case of organ donation. Or, if a mother must give her life to protect her fetus, parents must give 
their lives to protect their child.  
 
Scope of the Obligation to Donate 
 
 It is not common for people to advocate for the total prohibition of abortion, even when 
terminating the fetus is necessary to save the mother’s life. Most people allow that there are 
some morally permissible abortions. As we have discussed, the scope of the obligation to donate 
is proportional to the obligation to not terminate a fetus. As the range of circumstances in which 
abortion is impermissible narrows, so does the range of circumstances in which a parent is 
obligated to donate an organ. 
 Suppose that one holds that abortion is permissible only if the mother will die if the fetus 
is not terminated. In that case, the parallel obligation to donate would be similarly narrow, such 
that a parent would not be obligated to donate any organ the loss of which would cause their 
death. But the parent would be obligated to donate other organs, such as a kidney or liver, even if 
it means that donating will permanently and significantly burden the parent. This is the sort of 
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obligation to donate that religious institutions’ such as those governed by the Ethical and 
Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services imply. When abortion is wrong, except 
when the mother’s life is at stake, failing to donate an organ is wrong, except when the parent’s 
life is at stake. Or, conversely, if a woman can permissibly terminate a fetus only when doing so 
is necessary to secure something else of great value to her (such as continued life), then a parent 
can permissibly refuse to donate only when doing so is necessary to secure something of great 
value to them.   
 Narrowing the scope even further, one might hold that abortion is permissible only if the 
mother would die or be permanently and significantly burdened if the fetus were not terminated. 
The parallel obligation to donate would then be determined by what burdens a mother must bear 
for her fetus. If the mother must bear great burdens for her fetus, then so must the parent for their 
child. This may still obligate them to donate a kidney or liver, or the obligation to donate may be 
limited to some tissues and blood products. But given that one can live a comparatively 
unburdened life without one kidney or without some of their liver, requiring a mother to bear a 
permanent but low burden in order to protect the fetus during pregnancy will still obligate the 
parent to donate these organs. What is the comparable burden to living a life without one kidney? 
It’s hard to say. It may be equivalent to the burden of caring for a child. It may be equivalent to 
living with the permanent physical changes that can accompany pregnancy and childbirth. These 
changes may include pelvic floor damage resulting in persistent incontinence1415. Women who 
experience pregnancy complications such as gestational diabetes or preeclampsia experience 
twice the risk of coronary artery disease and stroke later in life16. Additionally, pregnancy-related 
changes may exacerbate underlying maternal health defects such as thrombophilia, 
glomerulopathy, or arterial aneurysms17. These are significant risks and burdens. Living a life 
without one kidney is plausibly less burdensome over a lifetime than permanent pelvic floor 
damage. 
 There is, however, a baseline obligation to donate that can be derived from the 
proscription of abortion. Some argue that abortion for the sake of convenience should be 
prohibited because the mother’s burden of inconvenience does not release the mother from her 
duty to protect. But there is no guarantee that childbirth, a major medical procedure, will remain 
simply inconvenient and proceed without serious harm to the mother. The maternal mortality rate 
in the USA, as of 2018, is 17.4 per 100,000 live births as of 201818. In a study of abortions 
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between 1998 and 2010, legal abortions in the USA carried a lower risk of mortality than 
childbirth at a rate of 0.7 per 100,000 abortions19. If a woman is pregnant, the numbers tell us 
that abortion carries less risk of death than does carrying the pregnancy to term. However, 
opponents of abortion argue that the risk to the mother is acceptable in comparison to the benefit 
the fetus receives—survival.  
If we accept the view that the costs and potential risks to the mother are worth the benefit 
to the fetus, in addition to the view that a mother has special obligations to her fetus that mandate 
her taking on those costs, there are other costs that we then must mandate. If we maintain that it 
is wrong for a woman to abort a healthy, viable, planned fetus because she does not want to take 
the risk of dying in childbirth, it is also wrong for her to deny other medical procedures for the 
sake of her child’s survival that carry comparable risk of death. If it is wrong for her to abort 
because the risk of carrying to term is acceptably small in the face of benefit to the fetus, then it 
is also wrong for her to withhold donation of blood products or other organs, which carries lower 
risk than childbirth and may similarly preserve the child’s life. It is wrong for her to not donate 
blood or tissues or a kidney, even if she does not want to, because it violates her duty to protect 
her child. This is the baseline obligation to donate. Prohibitions of abortion, by parity of 
reasoning, require a proportionate compulsion to donate. If elective abortions are restricted at all, 
then at a minimum a parent has a duty to donate blood products, which is not nearly as 
burdensome or dangerous as carrying a full term pregnancy. They may also have a duty to 
donate other tissues in which the donation process carries similar risk to pregnancy and 
childbirth. For comparison, 1.47% of mothers in the USA experience a serious complication due 
to their pregnancy or childbirth20. Peripheral blood stem cell donors experience less than 1% risk 
of serious complication related to donation21, bone marrow donors experience a 2.4% risk of 
serious complication22, living liver donors experience a serious complication rate of 1.1-
1.3%2324, and less than 3% of living kidney donors experience serious complications25. 
Some hold that the circumstances of the conception make a difference as to whether 
abortion is permissible, as when the fetus results from rape or incest. However, this view is not 
compatible with the view that the special obligations arise out of vulnerability relations.26 Thus, 
one must hold that something else grounds the duty to protect, such as the relation being self-
assumed or voluntary (which in the case of rape it isn’t). But then doing so has costs of its own, 
as we discuss below. 
Penultimate draft. Final draft to be published in Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 
11 
Another common way that one might try to restrict abortion is according to gestational 
age. Such restrictions are compatible with the duty to protect. As long as we are presuming that 
fetuses have full moral status, the fetus’s gestational age is irrelevant. Considerations regarding 
development and gestational age, such as whether it has fingernails or a beating heart or can feel 
pain or is viable, are relevant only to the extent that they have implications for moral status. For 
example, one wouldn’t hold that a fetus at eight weeks with full moral status can be permissibly 
terminated at any point until it reaches viability. Note, however, that restrictions based on earlier 
gestational ages imply greater burdens for the mother, which in turn imply greater obligations to 
donate. 
Restrictions upon abortions imply parallel obligations to donate organs. A parent must 
donate a heart or both lungs or kidneys or face, if abortion should be prohibited under any 
circumstance. A parent must donate one lung, one kidney, liver, pancreas, intestine, cornea, a 
hand, or skin if abortion should be prohibited in all circumstances except those in which 
continuing to carry the fetus requires the mother to make significant sacrifices. If only elective 
abortions are prohibited, then a parent must donate blood products, kidney, or anything else the 
loss of which carries burdens comparable to those associated with pregnancy and labor and 
delivery. Thus, where there are institutional or legal restrictions upon abortion there should also 
be institutional or legal requirements to donate.  
 
How to Be Excused from the Obligation to Donate 
 
 There are a number of ways a parent may avoid having an obligation to donate organs. 
One is by simply not being able to. One is not obligated to do things that they can’t do. A parent 
might not be able to donate to their child for one of many different reasons. The most common 
reason a parent may be unable to donate to their child is that they are not an appropriate 
biological match. Or, to put it in terms of the duty to protect, when a parent is not biologically 
appropriate for donation, their child is not vulnerable to them in that particular way. Thus, there 
is no parental duty to protect their child in that particular way.  
 But even if a parent is excused from the obligation to donate because they are not a 
biological match, they still must satisfy other aspects of their duty to protect, such as by 
facilitating donation. Children in need of organs whose parents are not a match are nevertheless 
Penultimate draft. Final draft to be published in Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 
12 
vulnerable to parents in other ways. They rely on their parents to help facilitate the donation. 
Parents must therefore do the things that they need to do to participate in exchanges or cooperate 
with organ procurement organizations. In most facilities, satisfying the duty would simply 
require cooperating with the treating hospital as they facilitate the organ transplant. 
 Another way a parent may be excused from the obligation to donate is by transferring the 
child’s vulnerability to another person by way of adoption. This excuse is limited, however27. An 
adopted child is primarily vulnerable to their adoptive parents. But the adopted child may still be 
biologically vulnerable to their biological parent. A biological parent of an adopted child may be 
the only person biologically appropriate for donation. If so, then the child is highly vulnerable to 
their biological parent and, therefore, that parent has an obligation to donate. Or there may be 
circumstances in which there are multiple matches, but too many candidate recipients prioritized 
over the child. In that case, the biological parent does have a duty to donate, for they alone can 
repair that vulnerability. It’s not as though there is some special duty that arises out of a 
biological relation or some notion of responsibility. Reproducing simply makes it more likely 
that there will be a person who is vulnerable to only the parent. So although giving a child up for 
adoption transfers most parental obligation to the adoptive parents (or the adoption agency, in the 
interim), some obligations may always remain. 
 The vulnerability relation depends in part on how far apart in time and space the two 
people are. If egg and sperm donors are near enough in time and space such that offspring who 
result from their gametes are highly vulnerable to them, then these donors must also donate 
organs or tissues. These responsibilities to donate organs continue even if the sperm or egg donor 
takes no other parental role and even if there is no relationship between child and donor parent 
other than biological. If special obligations and preservation of life override autonomy in the 
case of parent-child situations where bodily aid is required, the biological parent remains 
obligated to donate because they are the most likely to be capable of rendering such aid. 
More challenging cases are those in which a mother who is, by neurological criteria, 
dead, but nevertheless pregnant. If fetal survival and special obligations override parental bodily 
autonomy enough so as to prohibit abortion, maternal brain death does not necessarily release a 
pregnant woman from her duty to protect the life of her child at physical cost to herself. Being 
incapable of an act relieves one of the duty to perform it. This is often the case when pregnant 
women die, but there have been cases of maternal brain death where the fetus remains healthy 
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and the mother remains capable of continuing her pregnancy after death with appropriate 
medical intervention28. As in the case of adoption, in these cases there is no one else who is 
capable of satisfying the fetus’ needs other than the biological parent, specifically the mother. 
Because no one else can assume these obligations and as death does not change the fact that she 
is the only one physically capable of preserving the fetus’ life, her special obligations continue 
postmortem.  
In cases of a pregnant woman who becomes brain dead, she should become an organ 
donor and remain on life support with all possible interventions given to keep the fetus alive until 
birth, if possible. This contradicts the most commonly followed view in organ retrieval practices, 
which holds that the prior wishes (if known) of an organ donor should determine what is done 
with their body once they are deceased2930, as their bodily autonomy remains intact after death. 
According to this view on postmortem treatment of bodies, pregnant brain dead women should 
be treated according to the woman’s advance directives or according to the wishes of their next 
of kin31. However, Anstotz argues that a fetus has a right to life strong enough to warrant 
mandating life support regardless of the woman’s wishes or those of her next of kin3233. We 
would add that parents have special obligations to protect their offspring’s interests and that the 





 We have argued that the conjunction of the following three claims implies a parental 
obligation to donate to their child: 
(a) that fetuses have full moral status;  
(b) that a duty to protect holds between mother and fetus; 
(c) that abortion should be prohibited. 
If these three propositions are true, then what one says about restrictions upon abortions is what, 
by parity of reasoning, they should say about organ donation. If abortion is permissible in most 
circumstances, then organ donation is not frequently obligatory. But if abortion is permissible in 
few circumstances, then organ donation is frequently obligatory. Loose abortion restrictions 
imply a loose obligation to donate. Whether organ donation is obligatory depends on the degree 
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to which a parent must sacrifice in order to satisfy it (i.e., the strength of the duty to protect), and 
this degree of sacrifice is fixed by what one says about the mother’s required sacrifice for her 
fetus. Or, the duty to donate is fixed both by what one says about the strength of the duty to 
protect a fetus as well as what one says is in the set of circumstances in which abortion ought to 
be prohibited. 
 There are several strategies one might use to object to this reasoning. One is to simply 
deny that the duties a mother has to her fetus are the same as those that a parent has to their child. 
If this is true, then what one says about abortion will be different from what one says about organ 
donation. But it’s unclear how this argument could go, if fetuses also have full moral status and 
that a duty to protect holds between mother and fetus. One difference between a fetus and a child 
is that one is in the mother’s body and the other isn’t. Another difference is that fetuses are not 
conscious but children are. But these differences are morally relevant only to the extent that they 
imply differences in either vulnerability or moral status. Differences in consciousness are 
morally irrelevant, because such differences are only ever morally relevant for discriminating 
moral status, and we are presuming that a fetus has full moral status. 
 It may be that the fetus in the mother’s body is significantly more vulnerable to its mother 
than the average child is to its parents. But the child who needs an organ is just as vulnerable to 
their parent as the fetus is to its mother.  Whatever a mother owes her fetus will be the same as 
what she owes her newborn. And what she owes her newborn will be what she owes her toddler 
(though how she pays these debts may differ). And so on. If she owes her fetus her life so that it 
may live, then the parent’s obligation to their similarly vulnerable child is the same. If she owes 
merely the burden of pregnancy and the temporary use of her organs, then the parent must pay 
the same to their child.  
 One may instead deny one of the propositions (a)-(c). The opponent of abortion can’t 
deny (c), or else they wouldn’t be an opponent of abortion. They may deny (a), but then the case 
that any abortion restriction is permissible is much weaker. Thus, to avoid the implication that 
parents must donate organs if a mother cannot terminate a fetus, one may deny (b) that a duty to 
protect holds between mother and fetus. Above we mention that someone might agree that a duty 
to protect holds between mother and fetus, but only if that duty is self-assumed, as the voluntarist 
about special obligations believes. Such a view might initially appear as a way to undermine the 
obligation to donate, but it does not. Parents, in virtue of continuing to parent their children, self-
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assume the duty to protect their children. Though a voluntarist foundation of the special 
obligations may help to define which abortions are permissible and which are not, in so doing it 
will also define when donating is obligatory and when it isn’t. Or, once the opponent of abortion 
declares an account of the duty to protect, the circumstances in which abortion is impermissible 
will be defined, and by parity of reasoning the circumstances in which organ donation is 
obligatory. The obligation to donate arises out of a duty to protect common to the mother-fetus 
relation and the parent-child relation. So adopting a different account of the duty to protect offers 
no protection for those opponents of abortion who also want to deny that organ donation is 
obligatory.  
 The alternative is to deny that a duty to protect holds between mother and fetus. But 
doing so is costly. It requires that one deny that we have special obligations like a duty to protect 
our children. If fetuses have full moral status and in general we have special obligations to 
others, then it is not clear how one can consistently maintain that a mother lacks a special 
obligation to her fetus but has one toward her child. Whatever one says grounds the special 
obligation—the protectee’s vulnerability, the protector’s self-assuming it—what is true of the 
child is also true of the fetus, so long as a fetus and child have the same moral status. If it’s not 
moral status that changes upon birth, then there ought to be no difference in obligation from the 




 We have argued that if abortion is to be restricted, then there are parallel obligations a 
parent has to donate organs, tissues, or blood to their child. The strength of the obligation to 
donate is proportional to the strength of the restriction of abortion. If abortion is never 
permissible, then a parent must always donate any organ (presuming they are a match). If 
abortion is sometimes permissible and sometimes not, then organ donation is sometimes 
obligatory and sometimes not.  
 We are not arguing that abortion should be permitted or prohibited. Our concern is rather 
in how these permissions and prohibitions interact with other moral obligations, given other 
plausible claims, such as the claim that fetuses have full moral status or the claim that special 
obligations hold between parent and child.  
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 It is also important to note that our argument doesn’t imply that a parent is compelled to 
donate an organ to their child, regardless of what one says about abortion. One could easily and 
consistently maintain that satisfying the duty to protect doesn’t require a child’s use of their 
parent’s organs, if that use is necessary to sustain the life of the child. It might be that organ 
donation goes above and beyond any duty to protect. However, this position isn’t open to 
opponents of abortion. If, along with their view that abortion should be prohibited, that a duty to 
protect holds between mother and fetus and that the fetus has full moral status—both claims that 
they should make—then they must also claim that organ donation is compulsory. Thus, as they 
advocate for laws that restrict abortion, they, on pain of inconsistency, should also advocate for 
laws that compel organ donation. 
 That opponents of abortion may additionally be committed to compulsory organ donation 
may constitute for some a reductio ad absurdum, leaving only the opposition to abortion to 
reject. But for others, the commitment to compulsory organ donation may be welcome. The point 
is not about whether a parent is willing to donate organs to their child; it’s that they don’t have a 
choice in the matter. We take no stand on whether the commitment to compulsory organ 
donation is an implausible commitment. But if a person doesn’t want to donate their organs, even 
at the cost of their own life, to their child, then that same person also shouldn’t oppose abortion. 
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